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@¡‰ñ‚ÍA–â‘肪‰p•¶‚Å‚·‚̂Œ÷Ø‚ðŽŸX‰ñu‹`i‚UŒŽ‚Q‚U“új‚Æ‚µ‚Ü‚·B

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@u‹`‚Åà–¾‚µ‚½‚悤‚ÉA‘ÛŽi–@Ù”»Š‚̃jƒJƒ‰ƒOƒAŽ–Œ”»Œˆi‚P‚X‚W‚U”Nj‚ÍŠµK‘Û–@‚̬—§‰ß’ö‚ÉŠÖ‚µ‚Ä’–Ú‚·‚ׂ«”»’f‚ð‰º‚µ‚½B”»Œˆ•¶‚ÌŠY“–‰ÓŠ‚ÍŽŸ‚̂Ƃ¨‚èB‚È‚¨Aˆø—p•¶’†‚Ìhthe rules in questionh‚Ƃ͊±Â‹ÖŽ~‹K‘¥‚Æ•—ÍsŽg‹ÖŽ~‹K‘¥‚Å‚ ‚éB

@o“T@I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 98, para. 186.@iŽQl@”»—áW p. 501j

     It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each otherfs internal affairs.  The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.  In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.  If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the Statefs conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.

 

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@o“T@I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 43, para. 74.@iŽQl@”»—áWp. 160j

     Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniformc and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.

 

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